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A TALE OF TWO MINORITY GROUPS: CAN TWO 
DIFFERENT MINORITY GROUPS BRING A 
COALITION SUIT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965? 
Sara Michaloski+ 
Perhaps what is most disturbing is that the practical effect of the 
majority’s holding requires the adoption of some sort of racial purity 
test, so that minority group members can be properly identified and 
kept in their place.  If we are to make these distinctions, where will 
they end? . . . Perhaps we will return to a time of classifying  
African-Americans as quadroons and octoroons for the purpose of 
racial classification.”1 
Half a century before “minority coalitions” were made a noticeable issue 
before the courts,2 hundreds of Americans—both black and white—united on 
Sunday, March 7, 1965, in Selma, Alabama to rally for equal voting rights.3  On 
that fateful day, fifty unsympathetic state troopers and numerous others attacked 
                                                 
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2014, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 
2010, The University of Maryland, College Park.  The author would like to thank her parents, John 
and Cathy Michaloski, for their encouragement, guidance and unconditional love, her sister Julia 
and Skip for their constant love and support, Professor Rienzi for his sound advice and the Catholic 
University Law Review for their tireless efforts in bringing this Note to publication.  This Note is 
dedicated to the memory of the author’s grandfather, Leo John Michaloski, a Justice Department 
attorney who will be remembered for his zealous advocacy and gentle spirit. 
 1. Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1401–02 (6th Cir. 1996) (Keith, J., dissenting) 
(internal citations omitted).  “Quadroon” and “octoroon” are racial classifications used in early 
American history to describe people who are one-quarter and one-eighth, respectively, of African-
American ancestry.  MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 805, 954 (10th ed. 1997).  
Judge Keith’s criticism of a “racial purity test” is in reference to the Nixon majority’s finding that 
two minority groups could not combine, or form a minority coalition, to seek protection of Section 
2 of the Voting Rights Act.  See Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1393, 1401–02. 
 2. Christopher E. Skinnell, Comment, Why Courts Should Forbid “Minority Coalition” 
Plaintiffs Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Absent Clear Congressional Authorization, 2002 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 363, 363 (2002) (defining a “minority coalition” as occurring where two or more 
minority groups aggregate to claim the protection of the Voting Rights Act and challenge a voting 
practice or procedure under Section 2). 
 3. DAVID MICHAEL HUDSON, ALONG RACIAL LINES: CONSEQUENCES OF THE 1965 VOTING 
RIGHTS ACT 53 (1998); NICK KOTZ, JUDGMENT DAYS 282 (2005).  Selma is located in Dallas 
County and had a population of 15,000 people in 1965, half of whom were  
African-American.  HUDSON, supra, at 53.  Only 156 of these 15,000 African-American citizens, 
however, were registered to vote.  Id. 
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the peaceful protesters on Edmund Pettus Bridge, knocking many to the ground 
and beating them.4  That day will be forever known as “Bloody Sunday.”5 
President Lyndon B. Johnson recognized the dire situation exemplified by 
Bloody Sunday when he introduced the draft bill of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 (“the Act”).6  Congress passed the Act to fulfill the Fifteenth Amendment’s 
guarantee against racial discrimination in voting.7  Section 2 of the Act explicitly 
prohibits any voting qualification, or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, 
or procedure that results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen to 
vote on account of race or color.8 
Since the Act’s passage, Congress and the Supreme Court have repeatedly 
broadened the scope of the protection the Act confers.9  Congress has amended 
the Act twice: first, to include language minorities within the Act’s protection,10 
and second, to clarify that those claiming protection under Section 2 need only 
show how a particular voting scheme would produce discriminatory results 
rather than having to prove the procedure was created with discriminatory 
intent. 11   The Supreme Court has also reinforced and expanded the Act’s 
                                                 
 4. KOTZ, supra note 3, 282–84 (2005); see also Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, 
Canonizing the Civil Rights Revolution: The People and the Poll Tax, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 63,  
95–96 (2009) (“[T]he escalating voting rights campaign ... reached its climax on ‘Bloody Sunday’ 
March 7, when a peaceful march was shattered by a brutal display of police violence on the Edmund 
Pettus Bridge.”). 
 5. See Ackerman & Nou, supra note 4, at 95–96 (explaining that the “brutal display of police 
violence” that occurred on Bloody Sunday marked a pivotal point in the voting rights campaign).  
Many scholars consider Bloody Sunday as the catalyst that brought about the Voting Rights Act of 
1965.  Id. at 90; BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, FREE AT LAST TO VOTE: THE ALABAMA ORIGINS OF THE 
1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 148 (2007) (stating that the brutal attack on Bloody Sunday prompted 
the enactment of new legislation). 
 6. See 111 CONG. REC. 5059 (1965) (statement President Lyndon B. Johnson) (impressing 
upon Congress the egregious nature of the problem, its impact on the country and its population 
and the importance of passing legislation to correct it).  The Act was enacted on August 6, 1965.  
See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006 & Supp. 2012)).  Once the Act was passed, President Johnson 
hailed it as “a triumph for freedom as huge as any victory that has ever been won on any battlefield.”  
Remarks in the Capitol Rotunda at the Signing of the Voting Rights Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 840, 840 
(Aug. 6, 1965). 
 7. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 212 (2000) (noting that the Act was “a curious milestone” as 
it merely served to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment).  The Fifteenth Amendment provides that 
“[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,” and that 
“Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”  U.S. CONST. 
Amend. XV. 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a) (2006). 
 9. See infra Part I.C.1–3 and accompanying text. 
 10. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973a to 1973bb-1 (2006 & Supp. 2012)). 
 11. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. 2012)). 
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protection by upholding its constitutionality and broadly construing its terms, 
although with notable exceptions.12 
Although the Act protects both African-Americans and language minorities, 
there is disagreement over whether those groups can aggregate to bring a suit 
under Section 2 of the Act.  One scholar has noted that the expansion of the Act’s 
scope to include language minorities created the potential for minorities to bring 
coalition suits.13  Forty-five years after its enactment, circuits differ on whether 
the Act’s contemplated “protected class” should be interpreted narrowly or 
broadly, and specifically, whether two minority groups can combine to form a 
“coalition suit”14 to claim a Section 2 violation.15  Plaintiff groups permitted to 
pursue an aggregate claim have been unable to satisfy the threshold factors 
required to state a voting dilution claim, as set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Thornburg v. Gingles—typically failing to meet the requirement that the 
coalition be politically cohesive.16  The Supreme Court has reserved ruling on 
the matter thus far.17 
This Note examines the origin and meaning of Section 2 of the Act to analyze 
whether permitting coalition suits is consistent with congressional intent.  Part I 
analyzes the history of voting discrimination in America, the congressional 
intent behind Section 2 of the Act, and the Act’s ultimate purpose.  It also 
                                                 
 12. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966) (upholding the 
constitutionality of various provisions of the Act, including Section 4(b)), abrogated by Shelby 
County v. Alabama, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 384 (1991) (holding 
judicial elections are covered by Section 2 of the Act).  Although the Supreme Court has typically 
construed the terms of the Act broadly, the Court has deviated from this pattern twice.  First, in 
Mobile v. Bolden, the Court found that plaintiffs suing under the Act had to prove that the voting 
scheme in question was created with discriminatory intent.  446 U.S. 55, 78–79 (1980).  Congress 
counteracted the Court’s holding in Bolden by passing the 1982 Amendment.  See infra notes  
62–66 and accompanying text (discussing Bolden and the purpose of the 1982 amendment).  
Second, the Court invalidated Section 4(b) of the Act in Shelby County v. Holder, declaring the 
section unconstitutional because Congress did not update the coverage formula provided for by that 
section to account for the current state of affairs.  133 S. Ct. at 2631. 
 13. Aylon M. Schulte, Minority Aggregation Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: 
Towards Just Representation in Ethically Diverse Communities, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 441, 442 
(1995). 
 14. This Comment uses “coalition suit” and “aggregate class” interchangeably to refer to two 
minority groups that combine to bring a claim for a Section 2 violation. 
 15. Compare Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that 
the law does not prevent African-Americans and Hispanics from aggregating to create one 
aggrieved minority group for the purposes of a section 2 claim) and League of United Latin Am. 
Citizens, Council No. 4386 v. Midland Indep. Sch. Dist., 812 F.2d 1494, 1499–502 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(assuming African-American and Mexican Americans could aggregate to pursue a Section 2 claim), 
with Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1392–93 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a textual analysis 
of Section 2 does not reasonably support allowing separately protected minorities to aggregate to 
bring suit). 
 16. See, e.g., Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 41–42 (1993) (assuming aggregation was proper 
but concluding that the plaintiffs could not satisfy the political cohesion factor). 
 17. See id. at 41 (assuming arguendo that minority groups could aggregate to bring suit). 
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reviews caselaw setting out what factors courts should consider when 
determining whether a voting practice or procedure is discriminatory and the 
burden of proof a class must meet to show a violation.  Part II explains that the 
circuits are currently divided on whether two minority groups can (1) aggregate 
to bring a cause of action under Section 2 and (2) whether such a coalition could 
ever satisfy the political cohesion requirement.  Finally, Part III analyzes the 
circuit split and concludes that the Fifth Circuit’s expansive interpretation of the 
Act—allowing minority groups to  
aggregate—best accords with the fundamental purpose and underlying 
congressional intent of the statute. 
I.  TEARING DOWN THE WALLS: THE FIGHT FOR THE RIGHT TO VOTE18 
A.  Prior to the Act’s Passage States Successfully Employed Various 
Discriminatory Voting Schemes 
“[I]t is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity.  All our 
citizens must have the ability to walk through those gates.”19 
Although the Fifteenth Amendment gave all Americans the legal right to vote 
in 1870, for nearly a century thereafter states employed various discriminatory 
tactics and techniques to prevent African-American citizens from ever actually 
reaching the voting booth.20  Although the Justice Department attempted to 
combat these voting equities, Department of Justice attorneys handled matters 
on a case-by-case basis—which in some cases took years to eliminate a single 
instance of discriminatory practice. 21   But every effort to combat voting 
                                                 
 18. See Remarks in the Capitol Rotunda at the Signing of the Voting Rights Act, 2 PUB. 
PAPERS 841, 842 (Aug. 6, 1965) (describing the right to vote as “the most powerful instrument ever 
devised by man for breaking down injustice and destroying the terrible walls which imprison 
men”). 
 19. Commencement Address at Howard University: “To Fulfill These Rights,” 2 PUB. 
PAPERS 635, 636 (June 4, 1965). 
 20. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 114–15 (1982); 111 CONG. REC. 5059 (1965) (statement of 
President Lyndon B. Johnson) (noting that “every device of which human ingenuity is capable has 
been used to deny [African-Americans the right to vote]”); 111 CONG. REC. 8296 (1965) (statement 
of Senator Michael Mansfield) (“[I]n spite of the efforts to enforce previous legislation, 
discriminatory tests and devices are still with us. . . . Indeed, new forms of discrimination are being 
devised and applied as quickly as old ones are invalidated by the courts.”). 
 21. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 5 (“The enforcement of the law could not keep up with the 
violations of the law.”); H.R. REP. NO. 97-227, at 3–4 (1981).  For instance, in 1961 the Justice 
Department examined voting records in Dallas County, Alabama and found that sixty-four percent 
of the 14,500 white citizens were registered to vote, compared to only one percent of the 15,000 
African-American citizens, all due to discriminatory voting practices.  HUDSON, supra note 3, at 
60.  In 1965, an Alabama appeals court finally struck down the use of a discriminatory literacy test 
but took 4 years to complete the process.  Id. (noting that only 383 of 15,000  
African-American citizens were registered to vote prior to the court’s decision). 
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discrimination was counteracted by states engaging in creative new ways to 
prevent or dilute the African-American vote.22 
Some states enacted voting rules and procedures that were extremely difficult 
to comply with, such as literacy tests designed to result in failure,23 and poll 
taxes, which disenfranchised thousands of poor minority citizens.24  More subtle 
discriminatory voting practices included adopting a multimember or at-large 
voting system, in which voters were permitted to choose a candidate in all open 
races, rather than in only their district.25  Multimember voting systems tend to 
allow the majority to exert much greater influence in the election.26 
The Act was met with substantial resistance.27  In fact, over the years between 
Reconstruction and the passage of the Act, the disenfranchisement of blacks was 
                                                 
 22. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 6.  Some states gerrymandered districts to spread and minimize 
the African-American vote while others would “pack” all the African-American votes into one 
district to ensure the minority group could not elect more than one representative in an entire state.  
See Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court’s Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. 
CT. REV. 245, 250 (1993) (defining packing as a strategy in which district lines are drawn such that 
a few districts have high percentages of a minority group and the rest have lower percentages of 
that minority group and therefore minority candidates tend to win in the few concentrated districts 
but the minority vote is diluted in the rest of the surrounding districts); CHARLES L. ZELDEN, 
VOTING RIGHTS ON TRIAL, 74–75 (2002) (listing a variety of ways that states employed to dilute 
the African-American vote and dissuade African-Americans from voting). 
 23. See HUDSON, supra note 3, at 60 (explaining that the Alabama literacy test, for example, 
asked voters questions regarding military appropriations, piracy, and congressional procedure).  In 
fact, most of the difficult literacy tests were installed in southern states only after the Fifteenth 
Amendment gave African-Americans the right to vote.  See id. at 61. 
 24. Atiba R. Ellis, The Cost of the Vote: Poll Taxes, Voter Identification Laws, and the Price 
of Democracy, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1023, 1041–42 (2009).  Ranging from $1.00 to $2.00 a year, 
poll taxes were burdensome for impoverished citizens.  Id.  The Twenty-Fourth Amendment was 
passed to prohibit poll taxes in federal elections in 1964.  KEYSSAR, supra note 7, at 218. 
 25. See Rogers v. Lodge, 485 U.S. 613, 616 (1982) (noting that at-large voting systems reduce 
minority groups’ voting strength by increasing likelihood that the political majority will prevail in 
the election); see also George Bundy Smith, The Multimember District: A Study of the 
Multimember District and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 66 ALB. L. REV. 11, 11 (2002) (explaining 
that multimember districting is another method used to impede African-American citizens’ right to 
vote).  These voting schemes were effective in decreasing minority voter participation in the early 
part of the twentieth century.  ZELDEN, supra note 22 at 77 (citing various statistics indicating a 
drastic decrease in both voter registration and turnout among African-American citizens in many 
southern states). 
 26. See Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965).  The Court explained that the issue of 
the constitutionality of multimember districts was not presented in Dorsey, but warned that such a 
scheme could possibly “operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political 
elements of the voting population.”  Id.; see also Robert Barnes, Comment, Vote Dilution, 
Discriminatory Results, and Proportional Representation: What is the Appropriate Remedy for a 
Violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1203, 1204 n.6 (1985) (noting 
that the Supreme Court has acknowledged that at-large voting systems can be discriminatory, but 
has never held that they are per se unconstitutional). 
 27. See HUDSON, supra note 3, at 62 (explaining that the Act faced “heated” opposition).  
Opponents raised many arguments against the Act’s passage, including that the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, was adequately dealing with the voting issues and thus passing the Act was too hasty.  Id. at 
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supported at times by advanced legal thinkers and others who feared that giving 
blacks the power to vote would enable them to seek revenge on white 
communities. 28   Additionally, white supremacy and racial discrimination 
pervaded the attitudes of the American people for decades.29  Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr. and other civil rights leaders actively campaigned to draw national 
attention to voting inequities not only for African-Americans, but also for all 
who experienced injustice at the hands of the majority.30  As a result of these 
campaigns, the American people could no longer ignore the depth of 
discrimination minority citizens faced in the South, and moved Congress to 
make a national change—the Voting Rights Act of 1965.31 
B.  The Passage of the Act 
“Because all Americans just must have the right to vote.  And we are 
going to give them that right.”32 
On August 6, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Voting Rights 
Act to combat the long-standing inadequacies of the voting process.33  The 
means of accomplishing the Act’s goal of increased voter participation were 
two-fold: (1) to eliminate the historical practices and procedures that had 
                                                 
62–65.  Opponents also argued that the Constitution reserved the right to determine voter 
qualifications for the states.  Id. at 64 (noting that businessmen, members of Congress, and 
academics alike supported denying African-Americans the right to vote). 
 28. See LANDSBERG, supra note 5, at 11–12; see also KEYSSAR, supra note 7, at 70–74.  In 
the 1880s African-American scholar George W. Williams noted that although it was certainly 
unfortunate that African-Americans could not participate in the political system, such a result could 
not be avoided.  LANDSBERG, supra note 5, at 11. 
 29. See LANDSBERG, supra note 5, at 21–23.  For instance, U.S. Senator Bilbo of Mississippi 
was investigated but found without fault for “call[ing] on every red-blooded white man to use any 
means to keep the [offensive racial slur] away from the polls.”   Id. at 22.  The U.S. Senate 
committee investigating him found “nothing objectionable in those words . . . Bilbo did nothing 
further than earnestly and sincerely seek to uphold Mississippi law, custom, and tradition.”  Id. 
 30. Ediberto Roman, Coalitions and Collective Memories: A Search for Common Ground, 58 
MERCER L. REV. 637, 637 (2007) (quoting LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S 
CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER AND TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (2002)). 
 31. See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text.  Jim Crow laws exacerbated the problem by 
codifying segregation and discriminatory practices generally.  Frances L. Edwards & Grayson 
Bennett Thompson, The Legal Creation of Raced Space: The Subtle and Ongoing Discrimination 
Created Through Jim Crow Laws, 12 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 145, 145 (2010). 
 32. 111 CONG. REC. 5060 (1965) (statement of President Lyndon B. Johnson). 
 33. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006)).  Upon the Act’s passage President Johnson noted, 
“[t]oday is a triumph for freedom as huge as any victory that has ever been won on any battlefield”.  
Remarks in the Capitol Rotunda at the Signing of the Voting Rights Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 409 (Aug. 
6, 1965).  Senators who drafted the Act hoped it would rejuvenate the Fifteenth Amendment and 
“not only . . . correct an active history of discrimination, . . . [but also] attempt to do something 
about accumulated wrongs and the continuance of the wrongs.”   
111 Cong. Rec. 8295 (1965) (statement of Sen. Jacob Javits).  The Act was considered by many to 
be a significant instrument for civil rights.  See H.R. REP. NO. 97-227, at 3 (1981). 
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substantially hindered Blacks from voting;34 and (2) to provide citizens with a 
private right of action to ensure that states would not find new ways to 
discriminate.35 
The Act had an immediate impact throughout the nation, especially in the 
South, as barriers fell and minority voter registration began to increase—over 
one million black citizens registered to vote between 1965 and 1972.36  Despite 
the increase in voter registration, Congress remained concerned that states would 
resort to other methods to dilute the strength of the minority vote.37 
C.  Prior Changes to the Act’s Scope 
1.  Congressional Expansion of the Act to Language-Minority Groups 
Since the Act’s initial passage, Congress and the Supreme Court have both 
increased the protection the Act confers.38  The Act originally protected only 
African-American citizens, but in 1975, Congress amended the Act to expand 
the class of citizens protected within its scope to include “language minority 
citizens”—citizens whose primary language is not English.39  The amendment 
was promulgated based on a study by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 
which determined after extensive research that “language minority citizens,” 
similar to African-American citizens, suffered from high illiteracy rates and 
                                                 
 34. H.R. REP. NO. 97-227, at 4. 
 35. Id.  Congress made clear that citizens have a private cause of action to enforce their rights 
under Section 2.  42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).  During Senate hearings accompanying the bill, Senators 
noted that the Act’s ultimate goal was to increase voter participation.  111 Cong. Rec at 8296 (1965) 
(statement of Sen. Mike Mansfield).  Additionally, Section 5 requires states to seek federal approval 
before enacting any new voting qualification, prerequisite, practice or procedure.  See Allen v. Bd. 
of Elections, 398 U.S. 544, 548-49 (1969). 
 36. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 6 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N 177, 183; HUDSON, supra 
note 3, at 65 (describing the Act’s effect on Southern states and the significant increase in African-
American voting registration after its passage). 
 37. See S. REP. NO. 94-295, at 16–17 (1975), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 782–83 
(expressing concerns that states may resort to measures such as at-large elections or discriminatory 
redistricting plans to weaken minority voting power). 
 38. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1969) (stating that “the Act 
gives a broad interpretation to the right to vote”).  The Court held that the Act protects against both 
subtle and obvious regulations, and again “any state enactment” whatsoever that may have a 
disparate affect upon the voting power of a minority group.  Id. 
 39. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973a to 1973bb-1 (2006 & Supp. 2012)).  Language minorities include 
Hispanic-Americans, Asian-Americans, American Indians, and Alaska Natives.  S. REP. NO.  
94-295, at 24–25 (noting that “[l]anguage minority citizens, like blacks throughout the South, must 
overcome the effects of discrimination as well as efforts to minimize the impact of their political 
participation.”); Roman, supra note 30, at 651 (explaining how every large group of color in 
America has suffered oppression at some point, though the form and reason for the oppression has 
varied among groups).  In discussing past instances of exclusion, Roman emphasized the need to 
focus on and evaluate the effect of oppression of a minority group rather than the reasoning or basis 
for it.  Id. 
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language impediments that denied a large proportion of minority groups 
participation in the voting process.40 
Even prior to the 1975 amendments, the Supreme Court implied that language 
minorities were protected.41  In Wright v. Rockefeller, two minority groups 
brought a joint claim alleging that a New York redistricting plan violated Section 
2 of the Act.42  Although the two minority groups did not succeed on the merits 
of their claim, the Court implicitly condoned suits by language minorities and 
further, condoned coalition suits by allowing the language minority to aggregate 
with a group of black citizens to bring the claim.43 
2.  Congress’ Clarification of the Proper Burden of Proof 
In the past, even where the Supreme Court has broken with its liberal 
interpretation of the Act, Congress has typically stepped in to remedy the 
situation.44  In 1980, the Court took a drastic turn from its liberal interpretation 
of the statute in City of Mobile v. Bolden by requiring actual proof of 
discriminatory purpose, thereby substantially increasing the burden on plaintiffs 
in voting discrimination cases.45  In 1982, Congress amended Section 2 of the 
Act in direct response to Bolden. 46   Congress believed the “intent test” 
                                                 
 40. S. REP. NO. 94-295, at 25–26.  In evaluating the Act’s effectiveness of combating voting 
discrimination, the congressional subcommittee found considerable evidence of barriers to voting 
faced by minority-language citizens, including high illiteracy rates and the disparate effect of 
language barriers on registration.  Id. at 25.  Even more troubling, the Committee also found 
evidence of intimidation at the polls, denial of equal education, and discrimination in “almost every 
facet of life”—all too similar to the same issues faced by African-Americans in the South ten years 
prior.  Id. at 28–29. 
 41. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 57–58 (1964); see also White v. Regester, 412 
U.S. 755, 769 (1973) (holding that a multi-member election scheme for the election of state 
legislators impermissibly and unconstitutionally diluted the Mexican-American and  
African-American vote).  Various other federal courts also allowed non-African-American 
minorities to bring Section 2 claims.  See Coal. for Educ. Dist. One et al. v. Bd. of Elections of 
N.Y., 495 F.2d 1090, 1093 (2d Cir. 1974) (upholding District Court’s finding that certain school 
board election procedures was invalid under the Voting Rights Act, because they had a disparate 
impact on African-American, Hispanic, and Chinese voters); Torres v. Sachs, 381 F. Supp. 309, 
312–13 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding that Puerto Rican citizens were denied their “right to vote” when 
New York City election procedures were only conducted in English). 
 42. Wright, 376 U.S. at 57–58. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 69–70 (1980); S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 15–17 
(1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 192–94 (explaining that the 1982 amendments were 
intended to counteract the Supreme Court’s holding in Bolden). 
 45. 446 U.S. at 69–70; see also S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 25–26 (1982), reprinted in 1982 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 202–03 (“A fair reading of Bolden reveals that the plurality opinion was a 
marked departure from earlier Supreme Court and lower court vote dilution cases.”); Howard S. 
Scarrow, Vote Dilution, Party Dilution, and the Voting Rights Act, in THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 50 (David K. Ryden ed., 2d ed. 2002) (noting that Bolden increased 
the evidentiary standard by requiring plaintiffs to prove intent to discriminate). 
 46. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 15–17 (explaining that the 1982 amendment to the Act was meant 
to specifically counter the Court’s holding in Bolden because it placed “an unacceptably difficult 
2013] A Tale of Two Minority Groups 279 
promulgated by Bolden focused on the “wrong question” and placed an 
“unacceptable burden” upon plaintiffs attempting to prove a Section 2 
violation.47 
Instead, Congress declared that the amendment would allow plaintiffs to 
succeed on a voting discrimination claim if the plaintiffs establish discriminatory 
results.48  The results test does not require plaintiffs to prove the actual intent of 
the legislators, which would have been an “unacceptable” and impossible burden 
for plaintiffs.49  The Court first articulated the results test in White v. Regester.50  
The results test requires plaintiffs to show how a seemingly fair voting or 
electoral scheme was really not equally open to minority groups, the result 
therefore being, less opportunity for the minority groups to vote for the 
legislators of their choice.51  The Court in White declared that the fact that a 
                                                 
burden on plaintiffs”); KEYSSAR, supra 7, at 293 (noting that Congress amended the Act in response 
to Bolden).  The Senate Report accompanying the amendment observed that, after Bolden, plaintiffs 
were unable to meet the new burden of proof and attorneys stopped filing voting dilution suits.  S. 
REP. NO. 97-417, at 16, 26; see also Schulte, supra note 13, at 447 (discussing the decrease in vote 
dilution suits after the Bolden decision). 
 47. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 16; see also Voting Rights: Hearings on S. 1565 Before the Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 191 (1965) (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach, Att’y Gen. of the 
United States) (“I had thought of the word ‘procedure’ as including any kind of practice of that 
kind if its purpose or effect was to deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race or color.”). 
 48. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28.  Congress recognized that by eliminating the intent 
requirement, a state would be unable to negate a violation by stating a nonracial interest in the 
challenged practice or procedure.  See Frederick G. Slabach, Equal Justice: Applying the Voting 
Rights Act to Judicial Elections, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION 378 (Anthony A. 
Peacock ed., 1997); see also M. Nycole Hearon, Comment, “We Got Next”: Will Texas 
Redistricting Dictate a Definitive Answer by the Supreme Court on Minority Aggregation Under 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act? 7 SCHOLAR 71, 75 (2004) (explaining how “[t]he ‘effects test,’ 
unlike the ‘intent test,’ did not require proof of discriminatory intent to establish a Section 2 
violation.”); Rick G. Strange, Application of Voting Rights Act to Communities Containing Two or 
More Minority Groups: When is the Whole Greater than the Sum of Its Parts? 20 TEX. TECH. L. 
REV. 95, 102 (1989) (noting the three reasons stated in the Senate Judiciary Committee for rejecting 
the intent test: (1) “it is unnecessarily divisive because it involves charges of racism on the part of 
individual officials or communities”; (2) “it places an inordinately difficult burden of proof on 
plaintiffs” and (3) “it asked the wrong question”). 
 49. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 27–29. 
 50. 412 U.S. 755, 765–66 (1973). 
 51. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 (1986).  The most relevant factors that 
plaintiffs could use to establish a violation, include: 
(1) The extent of any history of official discrimination in the state . . . that touched the 
right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate 
in the democratic process; (2) the extent to which voting in the elections of the state . . . 
is racially polarized; (3) the extent to which the state . . . has used unusually large election 
districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices 
or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority 
group; (4) [. . .] whether members of minority group have been denied access [to a 
candidate slating] process; (5) the extent to which members of the minority group . . . 
bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, 
which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; (6) whether 
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racial group does not hold proportional seats in office is not dispositive of 
discrimination and that an additional showing is required, but Congress has 
noted that lack of proportionality can be relevant to the discrimination inquiry.52  
Thus, by adopting a lower burden of proof, Congress gave minority groups a 
realistic means of alleging a voting rights violation under Section 2.53 
3.  The Supreme Court’s Treatment of the Act 
Initially the Supreme Court played a strong role in enforcing the Act’s 
prohibitions and solidifying its constitutionality.54  In 1966, a year after the Act 
was enacted, the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the Voting 
Rights Act in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.55  In Katzenbach, South Carolina 
filed suit against the United States, claiming the Act was unconstitutional and 
seeking an injunction against the Attorney General’s enforcement of various 
provisions of the Act.56  The Court held that the sections of the Act at issue are 
“an appropriate means for carrying out Congress’ constitutional responsibilities” 
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment and denied South Carolina’s request for 
enjoinment.57 
In Chisom v. Roemer the Court again broadly interpreted the Act’s scope and 
held that the Act applied to the election of judges even though Section 2 of the 
                                                 
political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; (7) extent 
to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the 
jurisdiction. 
S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (citations omitted).  The report also listed additional factors that have 
had probative value, such as the responsiveness of officials to the needs of minority groups.  Id. at 
29.  In White, the Court upheld a district court’s finding that the multimember district at issue 
effectively excluded Mexican-Americans from the political process “in light of [the district’s] past 
and present reality, political and otherwise.”  White, 412 U.S. at 769–70. 
 52. White, 412 U.S. at 765–66; H.R. REP. NO. 97-227, at 30 (1981) (noting that while the 
amendment does not create a right to it, proportional representation, or lack thereof, can be a “highly 
relevant” factor in the Section 2 analysis).  Although Congress embraced the results test in the 1982 
amendment, it explicitly stated that the amendment does not guarantee proportional representation.  
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1000 (1994) (holding that 
although the proportion of elected minority representatives is not dispositive to a section 2 
violation, it is certainly a relevant factor); United States v. Marengo Cnty. Comm’n, 731 F.2d 1546, 
1560 n. 24 (11th Cir. 1984) (explaining that states are not required to adopt proportional 
representation, but there must be significant opportunities for minority participation). 
 53. See Strange, supra note 48, at 102. 
 54. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) (detailing the Court’s 
role in enforcing civil rights legislation), abrogated by Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 
(2013). 
 55. Id. at 308 (emphasizing how the implementation and enforcement of the Voting Rights 
Act is within the constitutional power of Congress, which supersedes any opposition by the states, 
and therefore holding that South Carolina’s request for enjoinment is forcibly denied). 
 56. Id. at 307. 
 57. Id. at 308.  The Court further explained that Congress’s means of protecting suffrage 
supersedes any powers reserved by the states.  Id. at 324. 
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Act only referred to the election of “representatives.” 58   In coming to its 
decision, the Court noted that the Act should be interpreted as broadly as 
possible to fulfill its remedial goal of eliminating racial discrimination in this 
country.59  The Court further explained that, had Congress wanted to exclude 
judicial elections from the scope of the Act, it would have done so, or at the very 
least, mentioned it during the amending process.60 
Even when the Supreme Court has departed from its trend of broadly 
interpreting the Act, Congress has typically reaffirmed the Act’s protection 
through the amendment process.61  In Mobile v. Bolden, the Court found that 
necessary element of a plaintiff’s cause of action under Section 2 required proof 
of a racially discriminatory motivation (that is to say, proof of intent).62  In 
Bolden, the plaintiffs, a group of black citizens, alleged that an at large election 
scheme unfairly diluted their voting strength.63  The district court and the Court 
of Appeals found black vote dilution, a history of voting discrimination, and 
questionable voting practices, and therefore invalidated the at-large voting 
scheme.64  However, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the 
plaintiffs were technically able to “register” and “vote,” there were no official 
barriers to the election of a black citizen to the commission.65  The Court’s 
holding in Bolden was superseded by congressional amendment in 1982, 
confirming that “results,” rather than intent, were the proper focus for Section 
2.66 
                                                 
 58. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 395–96 (1991).  Section 2(b) states that a violation of 
Section 2 occurs if the election process is not equally available to a protected class “in that its 
members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political 
process and to elect representatives of their choice.”  42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 59. Chisolm, 501 U.S. at 403–04 (citing Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 567 
(1969)) (listing, further, various examples where the Act had been broadened by interpretation or 
express legislation and emphasizing how the Act should be interpreted in a manner that provides 
the “broadest possible scope”). 
 60. Id. at 395–96.  The Court further noted that, given the past broad interpretations of the 
Act by the Court and congressional efforts to broaden the scope of the Act’s protection, its similarly 
broad interpretation in the present case was logically warranted.  Id. at 404. 
 61. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 15–17 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 192–94 
(stating that Congress has the constitutional authority to remove the intent requirement from 
Section 2). 
 62. See Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 393–94 (S.D. Ala. 1976), aff’d, 571 F.2d 
238 (5th Cir. 1978), rev’d, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
 63. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 58. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 73.  With respect to the effects versus the results of the scheme, the Court held that 
“disproportionate impact alone cannot be decisive, and courts must look to other evidence to 
support a finding of discriminatory purpose.”  Id. at 70; see also United States v. Blaine Cnty., 363 
F.3d 897, 909 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that proving a Section 2 violation does not require a showing 
of intent to discriminate). 
 66. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 15–17 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 192–94. 
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D.  Section 2 and the Gingles Test 
After Congress shifted the focus of a Section 2 claim from proof of intent to 
proof of discriminatory results, the Supreme Court established a three-part test 
in Thornburg. v. Gingles, which plaintiffs seeking Section 2 protection the Act 
must meet.67  For a Section 2 claim that a multimember or at-large districting 
plan diluted the minority vote, the plaintiffs must establish: (1) the minority 
group is “sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority 
in a single-member district”; (2) the minority group is “politically cohesive”; 
and (3) the minority must show “that the white majority votes sufficiently as a 
bloc to enable it—in the absence of special circumstances . . . usually to defeat 
the minority’s preferred candidate.”68 
For a Section 2 violation, a court must find “that the political processes 
 . . . are not equally open to participation by [a minority group]” because a 
minority group has “less opportunity than other members of the electorate to 
participate” in the election.69  Because the majority of Section 2 claims allege 
vote dilution,70 strong familiarity with the three factors of the Gingles threshold 
test is necessary to gain a thorough understanding of what constitutes a Section 
2 violation. 
1.  First Gingles Factor: The Minority-Majority Test 
The first factor of the Gingles test is relatively straightforward and only 
requires a determination of whether the minority group is “sufficiently large and 
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district.”71  
“Majority” is typically considered to mean greater than fifty percent.72   In 
Gingles, the Supreme Court explained that the initial  
“minority-majority” inquiry acts as a gatekeeper in that it requires the minority 
group to have, at the very least, the ability to elect representatives in the relevant 
                                                 
 67. See 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986). 
 68. Id. 
 69. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006); see also Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1304 (5th 
Cir. 1973) (en banc) (declaring that plaintiffs could succeed on a vote dilution claim by proving 
either intent or discriminatory results).  The Senate looked to the Zimmer case when establishing 
factors indicative of discrimination.  See S. Rep. No 97-417, at 23 (discussing the Zimmer opinion 
and its impact on subsequent voting dilution cases). 
 70. Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 
2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643, 650 (2006). 
 71. 478 U.S. at 50; see also Pope v. Cnty. of Albany, 687 F.3d 565, 575 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50). 
 72. Pope, 687 F.3d at 575; see also Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 18 (2009) (stating that 
the majority-minority rule requires that the minority group show that it comprises at least fifty 
percent of the voting age population in the relevant district); Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 461 F.3d 
1011, 1019 (8th Cir. 2006) (determining that only a simple majority, not a super-majority, is needed 
to satisfy the first Gingles factor). 
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district.73  Because the first factor is only a threshold question, it is satisfied if 
the minority group is large enough to constitute a simple majority of the 
population in the relevant area.74 
2.  Second Gingles Factor: “Politically Cohesive” 
Courts differ on how to interpret the “political cohesion” factor. 75   The 
factor’s purpose is to establish that the challenged election procedure or practice 
is the cause of the minority group’s inability to participate in the process.76  As 
the Supreme Court explained in Gingles, “if the minority group is not politically 
cohesive, it cannot be said that the selection of a multimember electoral structure 
[or other procedure] thwarts distinctive minority group interests.”77  Political 
cohesion and the third requirement, majority bloc voting, are often established 
in tandem through statistical evidence.78  The minority group must be evaluated 
as a whole “if one part of the group cannot be expected to vote with the other 
part, the combination is not cohesive.”79  In sum, a minority group that votes 
together is politically cohesive.80 
For minority groups who seek to aggregate, political cohesion is the most 
difficult factor to establish.81  Proponents of minority aggregation criticize this 
requirement because may be many diverse groups within a minority 
community.82 
                                                 
 73. 478 U.S. at 50 n.17 (“Unless minority voters possess the potential to elect representatives 
in the absence of the challenged structure or practice, they cannot claim to have been injured by 
that statute or practice.”). 
 74. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 (explaining that the purpose of the first Gingles inquiry is “to 
prove that a solution is possible, and not necessarily to present the final solution to the problem.”); 
Bone Shirt, 461 F.2d at 1019 (quoting Dickinson v. Ind. State Election Bd., 933 F.2d 497, 503 (7th 
Cir. 1991)). 
 75. Jack Quinn, Jonathan B. Sallet & Donald J. Simon, Congressional Redistricting in the 
1990s: The Impact of the 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act, 1 GEO. MASON U.C.R.L.J. 
207, 217–18 (1990) (explaining the various approaches taken by different circuits to the political 
cohesion inquiry). 
 76. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51 (defining the second factor of the Gingles test). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. at 56 (explaining that both the political cohesion factor and the minority bloc 
voting factor can be established by demonstrating that minority group members typically cast 
ballots for the same candidate). 
 79. Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1245 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 80. Id. at 1244. 
 81. See Schulte, supra note 13, at 484 (arguing that aggregation of different heritages should 
be allowed despite the difficulty in proving political cohesion). 
 82. See Chelsea J. Hopkins, Comment, The Minority Coalition’s Burden of Proof Under 
Section 2 of the Voting Right Act, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 623, 647-48 (2012) (citing  
Asian-Americans as a group with divergent political views due to differences in age and cultural, 
and the potential lack of Asian-American candidates).  Proving political cohesion is thus difficult 
for minority groups that seek protection under the Act, but are made up of many smaller 
populations.  Id. 
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3.  Third Gingles Factor: Majority Bloc Voting 
The third and final factor of Gingles requires a showing that the white majority 
votes as a bloc, generally enabling it to, absent any special circumstances, to 
defeat the minority group’s candidate of choice.83  The Court clarified that 
plaintiffs are not required to show intent or causation to establish the existence 
of a legally significant racial bloc voting.84  This requirement can be satisfied 
through statistical analysis of voting patterns and the study of elections.85  The 
existence of bloc voting is significant because it establishes that the minority 
community is politically cohesive and unable to elect their preferred 
representatives.86  Proving the existence of racially polarized voting is essential 
to a plaintiff’s case.87 
The Gingles Court also clarified that a state cannot rebut a plaintiff’s prima 
facie case of racially polarized voting with a showing of intent or causation.88  
                                                 
 83. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51. 
 84. See id. at 74.  The Court stated, however, that the candidate’s race is irrelevant to the 
analysis.  Id. at 67.  Additionally, previous elections may need to be studied to determine if a pattern 
of racially polarized elections has occurred in the past and continues into the present.  Id. at 57  
& n.25. 
 85. See id. at 52 (explaining that the district court relied primarily on statistical evidence to 
determine whether racial bloc voting was occurring).  Although North Carolina argued that the 
racial bloc voting at issue occurred naturally as a result of the differing values and socioeconomic 
classes of African-American and white voters, the Court in Gingles rejected this argument.  Id. at 
66.  Both minority and majority would often vote for people of their own race or class.  Id. at 68.  
The Court elaborated on the dichotomy of this argument: 
We can find no support in either logic or the legislative history for the anomalous 
conclusion to which appellants’ position leads—that Congress intended, on the one hand, 
that proof that a minority group is predominately poor, uneducated, and unhealthy should 
be considered a factor tending to prove a §2 violation; but that Congress intended, on the 
other hand, that proof that the same socioeconomic characteristics greatly influence black 
voters’ choice of candidates should destroy these voters’ ability to establish one of the 
most important elements of a vote dilution claim. 
Id. at 67. 
 86. Id. at 68.  Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving the existence of racial bloc voting.  Id. at 
46. 
 87. Stephen Ansolabehere, Nathaniel Persily & Charles Stewart III, Race, Region, and Vote 
Choice in the 2008 Election: Implications for the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 1385, 1387, 1392 (2010) (examining data from the 2008 primary and general elections to 
assess the geographic patterns of voting behavior to determine whether racially polarized voting is 
key to litigation under Section 2 of the VRA). 
 88. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 74.  The Court explained that causation and intent are irrelevant to 
the inquiry.  Id. at 63.  The Court noted that racially polarized voting “means simply that the race 
of voters correlates with the selection of a certain candidate or candidates; that is, it refers to a 
situation where different races (or minority language groups) vote in blocs for different candidates.”  
Id. at 62.  As part of its analysis the Court rejected the defendants’ argument that racially polarized 
voting is defined by voting choice “caused by race,” i.e., made because the voter was black, white, 
or a particular language minority, and not based on “the voter’s other socioeconomic 
characteristics.”  Id. at 63–64. Instead, the Court emphasized that “[i]t is the difference between the 
choices made by blacks and whites—not the reasons for that difference—that results in blacks 
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Gingles dealt specifically with the discriminatory use of multi-member districts, 
but the Supreme Court expanded the scope of the Gingles holding in Lulac v. 
Perry, applying the Gingles test to other voting practices and procedures.89  
While the Gingles decision confirmed that the proper inquiry under Section 2 
should focus on the “results” of a particular voting scheme as opposed to “intent” 
behind its employment,90 it left many other questions unanswered—such as 
whether two different minority groups can aggregate to state a claim under 
Section 2 and pass the Gingles test.91 
Section 2 of the Act continues to be a major deterrent to all types of voting 
rights discrimination.92   Voting practices leading to Section 2 suits include 
voting dilution claims, standards for candidate selection, irregularities with 
registration, polling, and vote counting, and creating voting districts.93  Justice 
Ginsburg recently noted the change in Voting Rights cases from  
“first-generation barriers to ballot access” in 1965 to “‘second-generation 
barriers’” in the twenty-first century such as racial gerrymandering, and the 
continual need for the Voting Rights Act to combat them. 94   The issue is 
becoming increasingly relevant as potentially subtle discriminatory schemes, 
                                                 
having less opportunity than whites to elect their preferred representatives.”  Id. at 63.  In rejecting 
appellants’ definition, the Court explained that socioeconomic characteristics tend to overlap with 
race in insular minority groups, especially where race was the cause of socioeconomic status due 
to past discrimination, and thus appellant’s definition further entrenches discrimination by allowing 
defendants to beat the test every time a group’s voting pattern is explicable on socioeconomic 
grounds other than race.  Id. at 64–65. 
 89. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 442 (2006) (holding that the 
state’s redistricting plan, in the totality of the circumstances, operated to purposely dilute the Latino 
voting power in the district after a Latino candidate had almost won the last congressional election). 
 90. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 71–74. 
 91. See KEYSSAR, supra note 7, at 294 (explaining that many of the terms used by the Gingles 
Court in its test were left undefined, such as “majority,” “cohesive,” and “geographic 
compactness”). 
 92. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 30 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207 (noting 
that Section 2 is the foundation for protecting minority groups against barriers to voting).  The 
Senate report accompanying the 1982 amendments to the Act further asserted that, in contrast to 
the plurality in Bolden, Section 2 is directed at all types of voting discrimination, including vote 
dilution.  Id. at 30 n.120; see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 (discussing the Senate report and the fact 
that the report makes clear that Section 2 prohibits voting discrimination of all types). 
 93. 3 JOSEPH G. COOK & JOHN L. SOBIESKI, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS 18-18 to 18-19 
(2006); see also Arakaki v. Hawaii 314 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a statute 
requiring trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs be citizens with Hawaiian ancestry violated 
Section 2); Goodloe v. Madison Cnty. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 610 F.Supp. 240, 243 (S.D. Miss. 
1985) (holding that the invalidation of predominantly African-American absentee votes violated 
Section 2); Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, 
Unconstitutional Elections and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 377, 378 (2012) 
(suggesting that “electoral arrangements that induce or sustain race-biased voting are vulnerable 
under Section 2”). 
 94. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2636 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see 
also Adam Liptak, Justices Void Oversight Of States, Issue At Heart Of Voting Rights Act, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 2013, at A1, A16. 
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such as voter identification laws, emerge throughout the country and as Section 
2 is now the primary enforcing mechanism of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.95 
II.  MINORITY COALITION SUITS UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE ACT 
A minority coalition consists of two or more minority groups seeking to 
combine or aggregate as one plaintiff class under Section 2 of the Act.96  The 
Supreme Court recently invalidated the Section 4 preclearance requirement of 
the Act in Shelby County v. Holder, but emphasized the importance of Section 2 
as a permanent and nationwide prohibition against discriminatory voting 
practices.97  The question of whether two minority groups can combine under 
Section 2 is thus important, not only as an embodiment of the original Act’s 
purpose, but also as a promise of equal voting rights for future generations to 
come.98 
A.  The Minority View: Under A Narrow Interpretation of the Act Minority 
Coalitions Are Impermissible 
In Nixon v. Kent County, the Sixth Circuit prohibited Section 2 minority 
coalition suits as an unwarranted expansion of the Act’s plain language.99  The 
                                                 
 95. See Sarah Kellogg, Voter ID Laws: Partisan Electioneering or Good Government?, THE 
WASH. LAW., Sept. 2012, at 23–24 (reporting on the increasingly divisive issue of voter 
identification laws and noting that the issue, may ultimately be decided by the Supreme Court); 
Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2636 (discussing “second generation” barriers to voting). 
 96. See Skinnell, supra note 2, at 363 (defining a “minority coalition” as occurring where two 
or more minority groups aggregate to claim the protection of the Voting Rights Act and challenge 
a voting practice or procedure under Section 2). 
 97. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631 (“Our decision in no way affects the permanent, 
nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting found in § 2”). Justice Ginsburg dissenting from 
the Court’s removal of the preclearance requirement stated, “‘[V]oting discrimination still exists; 
no one doubts that.’ . . . But the Court today terminates the remedy that proved to be best suited to 
block that discrimination.”  Id. at 2633.  She further noted that in its 2007 findings, Congress 
supported reauthorization of the Act to combat “second generation barriers” that existed as 
evidence of “continued discrimination” to equal voting rights.  Id. at 2636.  The Justice Department 
is filing suit against North Carolina, alleging that the state’s new law requiring voters to show photo 
identification “violates the Voting Rights Act by discriminating against African-Americans.” See 
Josh Gerstein, Justice Department Challenges North Carolina Voter ID Law, POLITICO (Sept. 30, 
2013 1:04 PM) http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/justice-department-north-carolina-voter-
id-law-97542.html.  Attorney General Eric Holder stated the Justice Department intends to show 
how these changes “‘would contract the electorate and result in unequal access to participation in 
the political process on account of race.’”  Id. 
 98. See Jamelle Bouie, Voting Rights Act Decision Poses A Crucial test for Republicans, THE 
DAILY BEAST (June 26, 2013, 4:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013 
/06/26/voting-rights-act-decision-poses-a-crucial-test-for-republicans.html (discussing how, after 
the Supreme Court struck down Section 4, states are moving to enforce voter-ID laws and other 
controversial voting laws that may disproportionately affect minority voters). 
 99. See Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1386–88 (6th Cir. 1996) (performing a strict 
statutory interpretation and textual analysis of Section 2 and concluding that coalition suits are not 
permissible). 
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majority explained that the plain language of the statute “does not mention 
minority coalitions, either expressly or conceptually;” furthermore, the statutory 
language in Section 2(a) speaks of “a class of citizens” in the singular tense.100  
The court explained that if Congress had intended to allow such coalition suits, 
the statute would have been written to read “‘participation by members of the 
classes of citizens protected by subsection (a),’” as opposed to referencing only 
a single class.101 
The court reasoned that any departure from the plain meaning of the statute is 
appropriate only “when the statutory language is ambiguous” or when the result 
of a literal application would run counter to congressional intent. 102   The 
majority found that the language of Section 2 was unambiguous and—in the 
absence of any direct evidence suggesting that Congress intended to allow 
aggregation—there was no ground for deviating from the clear language of the 
statute.103 
The Nixon majority distinguished the expansive interpretive trend begun in 
Chisom v. Roemer by arguing that the previous versions of the Act had covered 
judicial elections while neither the earlier versions of the Act nor its legislative 
history noted the possibility of coalition suits.104  Furthermore, in response to the 
                                                 
 100. Id. at 1386 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006)) (emphasis added). The majority stated 
coalition suits were a “fundamentally different kind of protection never contemplated by 
Congress.”  Id. at 1393. 
 101. Id. at 1386; see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 
999 F.2d 831, 894 (5th Cir. 1993) (Jones, J., concurring) (noting that “customary legal analysis” 
dictates that the Act does not support the minority coalition theory in part because “[b]y negative 
inference, Congress did not envision that each defined group might overlap with any of the others 
or with blacks”). 
 102. Nixon, 76 F.2d at 1386 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Kelley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours  
& Co., 17 F.3d 836, 842 (6th Cir. 1994)).  The court noted that neither party argued that the 
legislative history of the Act directly supported the idea that Congress had considered whether 
minority groups could aggregate to bring suit.  Id. at 1387.  Critics of aggregation propose that the 
Act’s silence with respect to aggregation indicates congressional intent not to allow minority 
coalitions.  Skinnell supra note 2, at 365 (arguing that minority group aggregation should not be 
permissible under the Act but proposing that minority groups should seek remedy from the Equal 
Protection Clause).  But see Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1395 (Keith, J., dissenting) (citing Wright v. 
Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964) (allowing claim brought by Hispanics and African-Americans 
prior to passage of Act)).  The majority agreed with Judge Higginbotham, who argued in his dissent 
in the denial of rehearing in Campos that “[a] statutory claim cannot find its support in the absence 
of prohibitions” of coalition suits.  Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1388 (quoting Campos v. City of Baytown, 
849 F.2d 943, 945 (5th Cir. 1988) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting)). 
 103. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1386–88.  The majority concluded that because the statutory text was 
unambiguous, it was not necessary or proper to look to legislative history and the court must decide 
consistent with the plain meaning of the text.  Id. at 1387, 1390. 
 104. Id. at 1388–90.  But see Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 53, 53, 58 (1964) (allowing, prior 
to the passage of the Act, a minority coalition suit to challenge an “irrational, discriminatory and 
unequal” redistricting plan, but affirming dismissal of the complaint because plaintiffs had failed 
on merits of claim).  In Chisom, the Supreme Court held that the judicial elections fell within the 
scope of the Act even though the Act’s language referred to elections of “representatives” as the 
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expansion of the Act in the 1975 and 1982 amendments, the Nixon court stated 
that Congress separately identified each minority as a “homogenous” unit that 
would not overlap with other protected groups.105  Therefore, the court limited 
the Act’s application and coverage to only those classes explicitly referred to in 
the statutory text for fear that a broad application would usurp the role of the 
legislative branch.106 
In support of its strict statutory interpretation approach, the Nixon majority 
addressed policy concerns associated with a broad application of the statute.107  
First, the court held that Congress did not make a finding on whether minority 
groups are discriminated against as an aggregate group.108  Second, the court 
noted that “the coalition suit” could also be used to justify “packing” districts 
with two minority groups in order to undermine their interests.109  Additionally, 
the court feared the effect allowing coalition suits would have on drawing district 
lines, as legislators would be unsure how to accommodate for one minority 
group or the combination of two groups when trying to follow the Act’s 
requirements.110  Fourth, the court explained that permitting coalitions would 
effectively eliminate the first Gingles requirement by making it such an easy 
element to establish.111  Allowing coalition suits poses significant risks for the 
statute’s effectiveness.112  Finally, the court expressed concern that allowing 
coalition suits could change the Act’s purpose from preventing discrimination 
                                                 
political processes the Act was designed to apply to.  Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403–04 
(1969). 
 105. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1390 (quoting League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 
v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 894 (5th Cir. 1993) (Jones, J., concurring)). 
 106. See id. (stating that the law must be applied as it was written). 
 107. See id. at 1390–92 (analyzing various policy rationales for refusing to allow coalition 
lawsuits under the Act). 
 108. See id. at 1390–91 (noting that the fact that Congress has found that both minority groups 
have been discriminated against separately does not mean that they are discriminated against 
together). 
 109. Id. at 1391.  The court reasoned that defendants could justify “packing” by arguing that 
minority groups in the districts that combined small portions of each minority could lump 
themselves together to form a coalition, glossing over the fact that these individual groups may not 
actually be politically cohesive and may have been better able to exert its influence if located in a 
district with a greater population of its individual group members.  Id. 
 110. Id. (referring to the decisions involved in designing districts in a situation where coalitions 
are allowed as an “impossible puzzle”). 
 111. Id. (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986)). 
 112. Id. at 1392 (citing Campos v. City of Baytown, 849 F.2d 943, 945 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(Higginbotham, J., dissenting)).  The majority cited Judge Higginbotham’s dissent in the Campos 
rehearing, in which he stated that: 
A group tied by overlapping political agendas but not tied by the same statutory disability 
is no more than a political alliance or coalition . . . so stretching the concept of 
cohesiveness dilutes its effectiveness as a measure of the causal relationship among the 
statutory disability, election structures or processes, and election outcomes. 
Id. 
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to advancing political interest groups and undermining the very meaning and 
purpose of democratic government.113 
B.  The Majority View: The Functional and Holistic Approach to Interpreting 
the Acceptance of Aggregation Under the Act 
Not all courts have narrowly interpreted the Act as banning minority 
coalitions.  In Campos v. City of Baytown, a group of black and Hispanic citizens 
alleged that the at-large election of the City of Baytown council members and 
the mayor violated Section 2 of the Act by diluting their minority vote.114  The 
Fifth Circuit in Campos conducted what has been referred to as a more functional 
analysis of the Act and found it permissible for African-American and Hispanic 
voters to aggregate.115  The majority in Campos affirmed that the plaintiffs had 
met all three factors of the Gingles test (including political cohesion) and held 
that under the totality of the circumstances, the at-large election scheme hindered 
minority voters’ ability to elect the representatives of their choice.116 
By moving beyond the strict confines of the statutory language, the Fifth 
Circuit’s more functional and holistic approach rejected limiting Section 2 to a 
homogenous class, embracing instead the remedial purpose of the Act by 
accepting that minority groups may share a history of discriminatory 
treatment.117  This approach takes into consideration the shared discriminatory 
past and the “lingering socio-economic effects of past official discrimination” 
experienced by both blacks and Hispanics because it centers on the results of 
discrimination suffered by each group, rather than its origin.118 
                                                 
 113. Id. (quoting League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 999 
F.2d 831, 894 (5th Cir. 1993) (Jones, J., concurring) (explaining that “[the] crucial problem inherent 
in the minority coalition theory . . . is that it transforms the Voting Rights Act from a statute that 
levels the playing field for all races to one that forcibly advances contrived  
interest-group coalitions or racial and ethnic minorities.”)). 
 114. 840 F.2d 1240, 1242 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 115. See id. (“There is nothing in [the Act] that prevents the plaintiffs from identifying the 
protected aggrieved minority to include both Blacks and Hispanics.”); Bartlett v. Strickland, 566 
U.S. 1, 32 (2009) (noting that Congress created the “ultimate functional approach” when instituting 
a totality of the circumstances test for Section 2). 
 116. Campos, 840 F.3d at 1244–50.  Furthermore, the Nixon dissent also pointed out that all 
other courts considering the legitimacy of minority coalition claims have assumed them to be 
permitted so long as the coalition satisfies all three Gingles factors.  Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1396 (Keith, 
J., dissenting).  The Campos court also articulated the circumstances under which a minority group 
coalition could satisfy the political cohesion factor.  Campos, 840 F.3d at  
1244–45.  The court stated that the coalition minority group must be considered as a whole, if the 
whole group, for example, African-Americans and Hispanics alike, can be expected to vote together 
and there is not evidence showing that one race will not vote for a candidate of the other race, then 
there is political cohesion.  Id. at 1245. 
 117. See Campos, 840 F.3d at 1249–50; Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1400–01 (Keith, J., dissenting) 
(elucidating further how different racial groups can share a history of discriminatory experiences). 
 118. See Campos, 840 F.3d at 1249–50; see also Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1399 (Keith, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the original motivations behind discriminatory behavior are not important and 
criticizing the Nixon majority for focusing on the origins of the discrimination instead of on the 
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Judge Keith’s dissent in Nixon further supports implementing such an 
approach as the Campos court suggests.119  Judge Keith argued that under a 
proper construction of the Act the term “class of citizens” is ambiguous, and 
therefore the court must consider the legislative history, congressional intent, 
and prior case law interpretations of the Act in addition to the Act’s plain 
language when construing the statutory term.120  Judge Keith suggested that the 
1975 amendment including language minorities within the Act’s scope was 
evidence that Congress was cognizant that expanding the class of protected 
groups could enable minority groups to aggregate to bring suit.121  Additionally, 
he noted that the Supreme Court had implicitly allowed a coalition suit brought 
by a group of African-American and Puerto Rican voters to proceed in Wright 
v. Rockefeller, which was decided prior to the 1975 amendments to the Act.122  
Judge Keith argued that because Congress had knowledge that plaintiffs had 
brought coalition suits in the past, as evidenced by Wright, Congress would have 
explicitly prohibited minority coalition claims along with the other 1975 
amendments to the Act had they wanted to deny minority groups the ability to 
bring such suits.123   Given the arguably vague language of the statute, the 
legislative history, and the overarching remedial purpose of the Act, Judge Keith 
suggested that a holistic approach is a better form of statutory interpretation to 
achieve the intended purposes of the Act.124 
                                                 
results).  Judge Keith likened the Nixon majority’s strict interpretation of the Act to the Supreme 
Court’s rationale in Plessy v. Ferguson, noting the “practical effect of the majority’s holding 
requires the adoption of some sort of racial purity test.” Id. at 1401, 1403 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. Of Topeka, Kansas, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954)). 
 119. See id. at 1393, 1395. 
 120. Id. at 1394. 
 121. Id. at 1395. 
 122. Id. (citing Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 53–54 (1964)). 
 123. Id.  But see id. at 1388 (majority opinion) (quoting Campos v. City of Baytown, 849 F.2d 
943, 945 (5th Cir. 1988) (Higgenbotham, J., dissenting)) (explaining that the proper inquiry is 
whether Congress sought to protect, rather than prohibit, minority coalitions when passing the 
legislation). 
 124. Id. at 1396–99; see also Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565–67 (1969) 
(rejecting a narrow construction of the Act and noting that Congress intended the Act to have a 
broad scope in order to combat racial discrimination). 
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III.  WHY THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND “RESULTS” INQUIRY OF THE FIFTH 
CIRCUIT IN CAMPOS AND THE DISSENT IN NIXON IS THE CORRECT 
APPLICATION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
A.  It is the Effect, Rather than the Origin of Discrimination that Matters: 
Differing Minority Groups Can Share a “Common Ground” in Oppression125 
The Act’s remedial purpose—to provide all American citizens the opportunity 
to vote for representatives of their choice—is best served through a broad and 
inclusive interpretation of the Act.126  The ultimate inquiry under Section 2 is 
whether a minority group has less opportunity to participate in the electoral 
process.127  This inquiry does not vary based on the composition of the class 
stating the claim, even if the suit was brought by a minority coalition.128 
Even otherwise dissimilar minority groups share similar impediments to 
voting.  Congress based the 1975 amendment to the Act on findings that 
language minorities suffered from the same barriers to voting as African-
Americans faced at the time the Act was initially passed.129  If two minority 
groups experience oppression at the hands of the majority, and they are able to 
establish the same burden of proof as one minority group might, then 
congressional intent to allow minority groups equal participation in our 
democratic system of government is best served by allowing them to form a 
coalition.130 
                                                 
 125. Roman, supra note 30, at 647 (stating that minority groups share a history of 
discrimination and oppression that serves as a common ground). 
 126. See supra Part II.B. 
 127. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44 (1986) (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28 (1982), 
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206); Salas v. Sw. Tex. Jr. Coll. Dist., 964 F.2d 1542, 1549 
(5th Cir. 1992) (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 36); see also Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1395 (quoting S. 
REP. NO. 94-295, at 25, 30 (1975) reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774 at 791, 796) (Keith, J., 
dissenting) (noting that Congress recognized that language-minority groups experience similar 
discrimination to, and face similar barriers as, African-Americans when it passed the 1975 
amendments to the Act). 
 128. The 1982 amendments to the Act clarified that the crux of Section 2 is whether the 
minority group experiences the effects and results of discrimination, and that inquiry does not 
change regardless of the origin, nature, or cause of such prejudice.  S. REP. NO 97-417, at 2 (1982), 
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 179. 
 129. See S. REP. NO. 94-295, at 24–25.  Specifically, Congress pointed to high illiteracy rates 
combined with discriminatory voting procedures that were only in English, which resulted in little 
to no minority group voting participation.  Id. 
 130. See Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1402 (6th Cir. 1996) (Keith, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that because African-Americans and Hispanics both experience discrimination and 
exclusion from the electoral process, the Act should be interpreted as protecting both groups 
“individually and collectively”); see also Hopkins, supra note 82, at 645 (arguing that allowing two 
minority groups to aggregate better prevents discrimination as it would differentiate between a lack 
of representation due to the lack of political support versus a lack of representation due to racial 
discrimination); Roman, supra note 30, at 651 (“The more significant point, however, is not the 
form of oppression or reason for it, but the effectuation of that oppression and the common result 
of treating these people as something other than full and equal members of this society.”). 
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B.  Separating Minority Groups for the Purpose of Bringing a Section 2 Claim 
Furthers the Very Discrimination the Act is Designed to Remedy 
The Nixon court explained that African-Americans and Hispanic Americans 
could not meet the Gingles political cohesion factor because Congress had not 
made findings specific to a coalition of protected minorities.131  The Nixon 
majority missed the point: the inquiry under Section 2 is whether a minority 
group has experienced significant barriers to voting that have denied them equal 
access and less opportunity to participate in elections.132  Because Congress has 
found that African-Americans and language minorities receive protection of the 
Act because they have both experienced significant barriers to voting, this 
protection should apply regardless of whether the two minorities choose to act 
separately or as a group.133 
Separating two different minority groups for the purpose of bringing a Section 
2 violation further separates, classifies and labels minority groups, thereby 
further entrenching their minority status rather than promoting the Act’s voting 
equality goal. 134  In fact, minority groups often have multiple subgroups as a 
result of differing internal cultures and histories. 135   Would further 
classifications be needed to separate these individual subgroups even though 
they all experience discrimination despite their similar political viewpoints and 
inability to elect political officials of their choice?136  A strict focus on the racial 
identity of the minority group overlooks the statute’s larger inquiry: whether, 
based on the totality of the circumstances, a minority group cannot participate 
equally in the political process.137  Focusing on the race of the minority group 
instead of whether that group has experienced barriers to voting furthers 
                                                 
 131. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1391. 
 132. See supra note 88 (explaining how the results test is implemented). 
 133. See S. REP. NO. 94-295, at 25. 
 134. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1401. (emphasizing that the disturbing aspect of separating minority 
groups and disallowing minority coalitions is that it implies a “racial purity test” whereas allowing 
coalitions would only promote the greater good).  Judge Keith further noted that classifying victims 
of discrimination is reminiscent of the Court’s endorsement of segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson.  
Id. at 1403. 
 135. See Hopkins, supra note 82, at 647–48 (noting that diversity that exists within Asian 
communities in the United States); Roman, supra note 30, at 643–44 (noting a grassroots effort by 
a coalition of Hispanics with diverse interests formed to protest an immigration bill as an example 
of intraracial and interethnic coalition that was able to unite in a common cause despite cultural 
differences). 
 136. See Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1402 (posing multiple hypothetical questions on how to draw lines 
within racial groups, whether those lines should be drawn and hinting at the negative effects of 
drawing such distinctions). 
 137. See S. REP. NO 97-417, at 28 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206 (stating 
that Section 2 aims to protect minority citizens’ rights to participate in the political process). 
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overbroad stereotypes and prejudices about and against the minority groups 
instead of providing equality in the political process.138 
C.  Congressional Amendments and Supreme Court Jurisprudence Illustrate 
that the Act Should be Interpreted with a Broad Scope and Inclusive Coverage 
for Minority Groups 
The history of the Act and Supreme Court case law illustrate a tendency to 
interpret the Act broadly.139  In particular, three seminal examples support a 
broad interpretation of the Act with respect to accepting minority coalitions.  
First, the Act was expanded to include language-minority groups in 1975.140  
The expansion to language-minority groups reflects a trend towards a broad 
expansion of the Act that may permit coalition suits.141  Such an interpretation 
would not require an affirmative congressional amendment for expanded 
coverage because the issue is rooted in race, and race is already established as a 
prerequisite for bringing a suit alleging a Section 2 violation.142  Second, the 
Chisom Court broadly interpreted the Act’s language, holding that it applied to 
the election of judges, despite the Act’s use of the term “representatives.”143  
Third, in Growe, the Supreme Court also assumed without deciding that two 
minority groups could aggregate and bring a Section 2 claim.144  As Judge 
Reavley noted in Campos, the law does not prevent two minority groups from 
bringing a single coalition suit.145  Half a century of case law interpreting the 
Act indicates that the Act has a broad and inclusive scope, and further, that even 
if the Act does not affirmatively assert something it does not mean that the thing 
not asserted is outside of the Act’s scope.146  If, as a result of discrimination, 
minority groups have less opportunity to participate in the political process, then 
                                                 
 138. See Schulte, supra note 13, at 473 (“[D]ifferences in culture and experiences of 
discrimination should not be determinative of whether the groups have suffered discrimination in 
voting and have been denied equal opportunities to elect candidates of their choice.”). 
 139. See infra Part I.C. 
 140. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 141. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 142. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006) (prohibiting States and their political subdivisions from 
using a voting qualification or prerequisite that denies a citizen’s right to vote because of “race or 
color”). 
 143. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. 
 144. Growe v. Emerson, 507 U.S. 25, 41 (1993) (assuming arguendo that two minority groups 
could aggregate prior to passage of the Act in 1965, but finding that the issue was ultimately moot 
because the coalition could not establish political cohesion). 
 145. Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Hopkins, supra 
note 82, at 642 (“While neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has expressly adopted minority 
aggregation, its general treatment . . . suggests general viability.”). 
 146. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 395-96 (1991) (noting the lack of the word 
“judges” in the act does not mean judges are outside the act’s coverage). 
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the underlying purpose of the Act would be best served through allowing the 
minority groups to aggregate.147 
D.  A Minority Coalition Must Meet the Same Burden of Proof as a Single 
Minority Group 
The Sixth Circuit’s concern that minority groups will misuse coalition suits is 
misplaced.148  Even if brought by a coalition, plaintiffs alleging a violation must 
satisfy the three Gingles conditions before a court can even consider whether a 
violation has occurred.149  Although the first Gingles requirement relating to size 
may be easier for minority coalitions to establish if coalition suits are allowed, 
the political cohesion factor will be more difficult to prove, thus limiting when 
minority group may aggregate.150 
The Sixth Circuit in Nixon emphasized the fear that coalition suits would 
provide minority groups with unfair political advantages.151  This fear is contrary 
to legislative history accompanying the Act, which emphasizes the 
congressional fear that minority groups were being unfairly excluded from 
voting elections and thus, from society.152  Additionally, the remedy for plaintiff 
groups under Section 2 is an injunction against unfair voting procedures153 and 
the goal of Section 2 is equality.154  Thus, the worst that could happen by 
allowing two minority groups to combine would be for a court to issue an 
injunction against a discriminatory procedure to provide equal voting  
rights—this is the very goal that Congress set to achieve when it implemented 
the Act in 1965.155  The effects of discrimination on one minority group, two 
minority groups, or two sub-sets of a minority group are all the same: 
disenfranchisement of the minorities in favor of the entrenchment of the 
                                                 
 147. See Schulte, supra note 13, at 468 (arguing that Section 2 should apply to coalitions of 
protected classes as the purpose of the Act was to protect those groups from voter discrimination). 
 148. Compare Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1393 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a broad 
interpretation of Section 2, allowing for minority coalition suits, was impermissible because it was 
not intended by Congress), with infra note 161 and accompanying text (explaining that even 
minority coalition suits will be required to satisfy the three Gingles factors). 
 149. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986) (explaining the three conditions a 
minority group must establish in order to bring a Section 2 suit). 
 150. See supra Part I.D.1–3 (explaining that the Gingles size factor is a threshold inquiry that 
is met by showing a simple majority, whereas the political cohesion factor is the most difficult 
factor to establish). 
 151. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1391. 
 152. See supra Part II.B. 
 153. See, e.g., Brown v. Detzner, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1242–46, 1255 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(rejecting a request for preliminary injunction for an alleged violation of Section 2 on the grounds 
that the plaintiffs could not show the requisite likelihood of prevailing on their claims). 
 154. See supra Parts I.A & B. 
 155. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
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majority.156  Because this is exactly what the Act seeks to prohibit, allowing 
minority groups to combine would only further the Act’s purpose of equal voting 
participation, while denying them the opportunity to lengthen the journey to 
political equality.157 
One proponent of minority aggregation has suggested a feasible solution to 
balance the fear of diluting the Act with Congress’s aim to protect minority 
groups from discrimination.158  Rick Strange has suggested permitting minority 
groups to aggregate if the two minority groups: (1) have “similar  
socio-economic backgrounds”; (2) have “similar attitudes toward significant 
issues affecting the challenged entity”; and (3) “have consistently voted for the 
same candidates” as an aggregate group.159  This approach more accurately 
reflects congressional intent and avoids forced separation of minority groups and 
requiring racial purity, while tempering the concern that coalition suits will be 
abused.160 
The functional and holistic approach adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Campos 
and the dissent in Nixon best reflects the Act’s underlying purpose and 
meaning.161  The “results” test adopted by the 1982 Amendment to the Act 
supports the coalition of two minority groups because it focuses on the results 
and effects of discrimination.162  The majority in Nixon’s focus on the race or 
type of minority group misses the big picture.  Therefore, courts should not 
preclude two minority groups from bringing a coalition suit under Section 2 
merely because the Act’s language references only a singular class; instead, 
courts should analyze the claims under the three Gingles factors to determine 
whether the suit is proper.163 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Congress passed the Act as a remedial device to cure past discrimination and 
aid minority groups in participating in a political system from which they had 
                                                 
 156. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (arguing that the focus should be on preventing 
discrimination against minority groups regardless of whether that group is a minority or multi-
minority community because the effects from discrimination are the same). 
 157. See supra Part II.B (articulating the Act’s intended goals). 
 158. See Strange, supra note 48, at 153–54; see also Schulte, supra note 13, at 457 (arguing 
that coalition suits should be permitted as long as combined plaintiff groups can satisfy the Gingles 
test as one plaintiff class). 
 159. See Strange, supra note 48, at 129.  If the two minority groups establish similar results, 
the court should permit the minority groups to aggregate.  Id. 
 160. See id. at 128–29 (arguing that this method is more reflective of congressional intent). 
 161. See Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1244, 1250 (5th Cir. 1988) (approving 
aggregate Section 2 claims by analyzing the Act’s history); see also Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 
1381, 1393–1403 (6th Cir. 1996) (Keith, J., dissenting) (explaining why minority coalitions should 
be allowed to bring Section 2 claims by examining the legislative history). 
 162. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 179–80. 
 163. See supra Parts I.D.1–3; see also supra III.A–B (describing the Gingles factors and 
explaining why the analysis adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Campos is the best approach). 
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been so long estranged.  To Congress in 1965, political participation meant more 
than just a vote.  It meant an education, the ability to get a job, make a living, 
and raise a family with the same opportunity as the majority.  A voting rights 
analysis requires this “practical evaluation of the ‘past and present reality.’”164  
Accordingly, only a broad interpretation of the statute aligns with congressional 
intent; if Hispanics and African-Americans view themselves as a single unit of 
disfavored minorities, they should be treated as one group under the Act.  
Furthermore allowing minority group coalitions may be “effective democratic 
vehicles towards social change.” 165   The Gingles threshold conditions and 
ultimate totality of the circumstances test create a burden of proof for plaintiffs 
that will protect the statute from misapplication, while simultaneously ensuring 
that the ultimate purpose of the Act is fulfilled. 
 
                                                 
 164. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 30 (quoting White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 770 (1973)). 
 165. Roman, supra note 30, at 638. 
